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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, particularly since Russia launched its renewed and expanded invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through December 27, 2023, the United States committed more than \$47 billion in security assistance to support “Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself against Russia’s aggression, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO,” according to the U.S. Department of State. Of this amount, the Biden Administration has committed about \$44.2 billion in security assistance since February 2022.

FY2022 and FY2023 security assistance packages were mostly funded via \$48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations. This amount included \$25.93 billion to replenish U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA; 22 U.S.C. §2318); \$18 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, §1250); and \$4.73 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF; 22 U.S.C. §2763) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” Another \$300 million per year was provided for USAI in regular FY2022 and FY2023 appropriations and via FY2024 continuing appropriations.

On October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted to Congress a request for \$106 billion in FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine, Israel, border security, and other purposes. The request includes \$18 billion to replenish DOD stocks, \$12 billion for USAI, and \$1.7 billion in FMF. DOD Comptroller Michael McCord informed Congress of the intent to obligate the remaining FY2023 replenishment funds by the end of December 2023. Congress continues to consider the supplemental request.

Prior supplemental appropriations included funds for U.S. European Command operations and related support for the U.S. military. See CRS Insight IN12107, *Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary*.

Overview of Programs Since 2014

The United States has used security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts.

Especially since 2021, the United States has been providing defense items to Ukraine via PDA, by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 54 PDA drawdowns valued at \$23.9 billion (Table 1). Most PDA packages since August 2023 have used previously authorized authority after a DOD review of PDA overvaluations restored up to \$6.2 billion in FY2022 and FY2023 authority.

USAI and FMF procurement packages have included equipment, training, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities (see Table 2).

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), as well as International Military Education and Training, which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Table 1. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2024 (in millions of dollars)

FY	Month Authorized	PDA #	Announced Value	Committed Authority
2021	Aug.	1	60.0	60.0
2022	Dec.	2	200.0	
	Feb.	3	350.0	
	Mar.	4, 5	1,000.0	
	Apr.	6, 7, 8	1,700.0	
	May	9, 10	250.0	
	June	11, 12, 13	1,500.0	
	July	14, 15, 16	625.0	
	Aug.	17, 18, 19	2,325.0	
2023	Sept.	20, 21	1,275.0	9,225.0
	Oct.	22, 23, 24	1,625.0	
	Nov.	25, 26	800.0	
	Dec.	27, 28	1,275.0	
	Jan.	29, 30	5,350.0	
	Feb.	31, 32	875.0	
	Mar.	33, 34	750.0	
	Apr.	35, 36	825.0	
	May	37, 38, 39	975.0	
	June	40, 41	825.0	
2024	July	42, 43	1,200.0	
	Aug.	44, 45	(450.0)	
	Sept.	46, 47	128.0 (372.0)	14,628.0
	Oct.	48, 49	(350.0)	
	Nov.	50, 51	(225.0)	
	Dec.	52, 53, 54	(625.0)	
Total:				23,913.0

Sources: Department of State and Department of Defense press releases through December 27, 2023.

Note: Since August 2023, most PDA packages (in parentheses) have used previously authorized Presidential Drawdown Authority.

Table 2. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2016-FY2024
(selected account allocations, in millions of dollars)

	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	85.0	99.0	95.0	115.0	115.0	115.0	1,317.6 ^a	325.0 ^b	
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	226.5	148.6	195.5	214.8	256.7	275.7	6,300.0	12,300.0	300.0 ^c

Sources: State Department congressional budget justifications, Department of Defense budget requests, and Department of State and Department of Defense press releases. Table data valid through December 27, 2023.

- FMF assistance from FY2022-FY2023 Ukraine supplemental appropriations also was provided to other European allies and partners.
- As announced by the Department of State; FY2023 FMF amounts are not final.
- As announced by the Department of Defense; available under FY2024 continuing appropriations.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allies, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before the war. This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia's invasion. Subsequently, DOD and U.S. allies resumed training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, both to operate weapon systems and at the collective unit level.

Provision of Defense Equipment

After Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. readiness to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.

According to DOD, USAI packages prior to FY2022 provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures. Since 2018, Ukraine also has used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment.

According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion through December 27, 2023, has included the following:

- 39 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); 1 Patriot air defense battery; other air defense systems; and 21 air surveillance radars;
- 31 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks and 186 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles;
- 300 M113 and 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 2,000+ Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
- 10,000+ Javelin and 90,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- Phoenix Ghost, Switchblade, and other UAS;
- 198 155 mm and 72 105 mm Howitzers and artillery;
- 227 mortar systems;
- Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
- 9,000+ Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
- High-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) and laser-guided rocket systems;
- 35,000+ grenade launchers and small arms;
- communications, radar, and intelligence equipment; and
- training, maintenance, and sustainment.

In addition, the Administration has approved third-party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and equipment from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine. According to

DOD, NATO and EU members and other allies have committed about \$35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.

Recent Legislation

Prior to and immediately following Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. Congress increased the PDA funding cap (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) from \$100 million up to \$11 billion for FY2022 via P.L. 117-128 and up to \$14.5 billion for FY2023 via P.L. 117-328. The Administration's October 2023 supplemental request proposes an FY2024 cap of \$7 billion.

P.L. 117-328 continued provisions from P.L. 117-128 that require the Secretaries of State and Defense to report to Congress on measures taken to account for the end-use of U.S. weapons transferred to Ukraine. The act also continued a requirement for monthly descriptions of U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. In addition, P.L. 117-328 appropriated \$6 million for the DOD Inspector General to carry out reviews of DOD activities to execute funds in the bill.

Discussion on Future Assistance

U.S. policy increasingly has recognized the UAF's ability to employ and operate advanced weaponry, including systems capable of supporting Ukraine's counter-offensive operations. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as those that can be immediately deployed on the battlefield to increase the UAF's resilience and ability to sustain offensive combat operations. In addition to advanced rocket and missile systems, these include protected mobility assets (such as armored vehicles), artillery and ammunition, communication, and intelligence support.

Ukrainian officials have sought to acquire other advanced systems, including more Western battle tanks, fighter aircraft, long-range missiles, and additional air defense capabilities. Increasingly, the provision of security assistance to Ukraine has focused on improving the UAF's medium- to long-term capabilities, including for sustainment and transitioning toward more NATO-standard weaponry, and on helping develop Ukraine's domestic defense industry. Debate continues about U.S. assistance to Ukraine, Ukraine's future warfighting prospects, potential for escalation, and the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to supply growing demands.

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